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A PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT OF PUBLIC MANAGEMENT
REFORM IN TAIWAN’S LOCAL GOVERNMENT
Milan Tung-Wen Sun
ABSTRACT
Although the “Administrative Reform Program” was initiated by former Premier Lian
Chain in 1993, the comprehensive “Government Reinvention” programs which
emphasized the notion of entrepreneurial government were proposed and implemented
by former Premier Vincent Shiew in 1998, and similar reform strategies and designs
have been followed by the DPP administration since 2000.  Despite the continuity in
reform efforts, full scale reform assessment based on concrete empirical evidences is still
difficult to be found.  The proposed study attempts to evaluate the results of government
reform in Taiwan’s local government by focusing on one major question: Have local
governments in Taiwan become “smaller and better”?  This question will be addressed
by looking at indicators in three areas: changes in the size of local government in terms
of human and financial resources, changes in the level of corruption, and changes in
citizen’s evaluation of the performance of local government.  It is argued that the
progress of government reform at the local level is slow, and the tentative evaluation
show warning signals.
INTRODUCTION
Nowadays,  few  governments  in  the  world  have  been  isolate  from  the  wave  of  reform
over the past several decades.  Given the different contexts and problems faced by each
nation, every government has taken divergent strategies or structural adjustments to
achieve  reform  objectives.   However,  the  situations  have  been  criticized  as  lack  of
“clear visions and integrated strategies” (Peters, 1994:299), and the results have tended
to be dissatisfied by many advocates of reform (Caiden, 1990).  Several alternatives to
the traditional model of governance have been proposed and practiced, the most familiar
one is that of market model of administration and the related “New Public Management”
movement, there are ample examples form the experiences in the United Kingdom and
New Zealand (Peters, 1994).  A different version of the market model has been
practiced in the United States -- the “reinventing government” – which emphasizes the
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notion of “entrepreneurial government” (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992).
Although the reform has generally focused on the central government, but eventually all
politics are local.  In the era of globalization, the deterritorization of public problems
demands both global frameworks and local implementations together to address these
issues.  In the age of reform, devolution is pivotal for the transformation of the role and
function of the state.  Therefore, any assessment of reform efforts also has to evaluate
the results of local government transformation.
The wave of reform also swept through Asian countries, including the Republic of China
(Taiwan), over the past two decades. The history of administrative reform in Taiwan can
be  traced  back  to  1949,  when  the  Nationalist  government  was  defeated  and  moved  to
Taiwan.  Since 1949, administrative reforms in Taiwan can be divided into three phases:
1949-1987, 1987-1998, and 1998 to present (RDEC, 2003).  Although the current phase
of reform can be described as from government to governance, the notion of
“entrepreneurial government” which characterized the second phase (RDEC, 2003:12)
still prevails on all fronts of current reform efforts.
Despite the continuity in reform efforts, full scale reform assessment based on concrete
empirical evidences is still difficult to be found in Taiwan, and few studies is devoted to
analyze  the  results  of  local  reforms  in  Taiwan.   This  study  attempts  to  address  the
research issue by concentrating on one major question: Have local governments in
Taiwan become “smaller and better”?  This question will be addressed by looking at
indicators in three areas: changes in the size of local government in terms of human and
financial  resources,  changes  in  the  level  of  corruption,  and  citizen’s  evaluation  of  the
performance of local government.  In the following sections, the evolution of local
governance in Taiwan is discussed first; then, an assessment of the results of local reform
on the basis of empirical evidences is made; it is followed by a brief conclusion in the
last section.
THE TRANSFORMATION OF LOCAL GOVERNANCE IN TAIWAN
Many scholars have analyzed the development of local self-governance in Taiwan by
dividing it into different phases (Hwang, 2000; Chi, 1999; Chen, 1999, Lee, 1999).  On
the basis of these studies, it is proposed that the evolution of local governance in Taiwan
can be distinguished into four phases (Chiang, 2006).  These “punctuated equilibriums”
are separated by three very important events in the development of local governance in
Taiwan, namely, the abolishment of martial law in 1987, the passage of Self-Governance
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Act for Provincial Government and Self-Governance Act for Special Municipality1 in
1994, and the designated date for the downsizing of Taiwan Provincial Government in
1999.
I. The Authoritarian Government phase (1949-1987)
The Constitution of the Republic of China2 went into effect on December 25, 1947, but
it was suspended in 1948 due to civil war.  After the Nationalist (Kuomintang)
government was retreated to Taiwan in 1949, the island remained under martial law until
1987.  During this period of time, much of the Constitution provisions were not in effect
and  most  of  the  local  government  policies  were  implemented  by  the  means  of
administrative regulations.
In the Constitution, Chapter Ten (Article 107 to 111) is designed to specify the
central-local relations, and Chapter Eleven is about the arrangements and provisions of
the Provincial government (Article 112 to 120) and County government (Article 121 to
128).  According to the Constitution, the autonomy of the Provincial (Article 112) and
County (Article 121) governments are contingent upon the passage of the General
Self-governance Principles for Provincial and County Governments by Legislative Yuan,
but such a law never existed.  As a result, local self-governance in Taiwan after 1949
was functioning on the basis of several administrative regulations issued by the
Executive Yuan and the Provincial Government.  The latter had served as an arm-length
agency of the Central government in supervising and monitoring local governance.
Among  these  regulations,  the Guidelines for Implementing Local Self-Governance
Among County Governments, issued by the Taiwan Provincial government, had served as
the most important legal foundation for the operations of local governments in Taiwan
until 1994.
In this phase, power and financial resources were highly centralized in the Central
government.  It was criticized as a “guardign local self-governance” in which the
Central government dominated the intergovernmental relations extensively.  It had also
been  described  as  a  “semi-autonomy”  in  which  the  Governor  of  Taiwan  Provincial
government and the Mayors of the Special Municipalities3 (Taipei and Kaohsiung) were
1 The English translations of laws and regulations in Taiwan are based on translations provided by Judicial
Yuan.  Information source: http://www.judicial.gov.tw/QnA/bilingual.asp.
2 The Constitution consists of fourteen chapters and a total of one hundred and seventy-five articles. It was
amended seven times from 1991 to 2004.
3 There are four government layers in Taiwan – Central, Provincial and Special Municipality, County, and
Township governments.  Due to the effect of downsizing, the Provincial government no longer serves as a
local self-governance entity.  However, it still constitutes one government layer, and the Special
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appointed by the Executive Yuan rather than directly elected by their citizens.  The
central-local relations during this phase emphasized national norms and the power of the
Central government to monitor the operations of local governments; the Central
government had monopolized the powers in every aspect of local self-governance,
including local legislation, financial and personnel administrations, organization
structuring, etc.; the Central government could revoke or repeal any administrative act
made by local government; the Central government could discipline any local official,
including the elected one, for misconducts or negligence.
II. The legalization of local self-governance phase (1987-1994)
Since  the  lifting  of  martial  law,  Taiwan  has  undergone  a  drastic  process  of
democratisation and reform, Tien (1989) describes the magnitude of the reforms as a
“great transformation.”  On the basis of nationalism, the rise of civil society in Taiwan
had forced the authoritarian regime to transform itself toward a system of democratic
governance (Shiau, 1995; Sun, 2003).  To reconstruct the local self-governance system
on formal legal basis was one important project for constitutional reform during this
period of time (Hwang, 1995).
Actually,  to  legalize  local  self-governance  was  already  on  the  ruling  party’s  (KMT)
reform agenda before lifting the martial law.  The demand for direct election of the
Governor of Provincial government was very popular during that time.  However,
considering the fact that the territories of Provincial government and that of Central
government were highly overlapped geographically, and the President was not elected
directly by the citizens yet, a compromised solution had been tried by the Kuomintang
Party by drafting an Organic Act of Provincial Government in which the Governor would
be nominated by the Premier and then ratified by the Provincial Assembly.  The effort
was challenged by members of the Legislative Yuan as unconstitutional and was
petitioned for constitutional interpretation, the Council of Grand Justices then made the
influential No. 260 Interpretation (Wu, 2003:48-49) on March 19, 1990:
According to (Constitutional) provisions, the Central Government has no
authority to enact individual laws for specified provincial assemblies and the
organization of the provincial government. The established provincial
representative bodies have no legislative power either. When applying the
Municipality is equivalent in status to the Provincial Government.
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Constitution, if matters that have not been contemplated at the time of drafting
arise, the central government shall respond by balancing the needs of the nation,
taking into consideration the special circumstances of the regions, and promptly
resolve the matters pursuant to the constitutional procedures. Prior to resolution
under the constitutional procedures, the self-governance and administration of
provincial and county governments cannot be suspended.4
The  compromised  effort  had  failed.   However,  on  the  basis  of  No.  260  Interpretation
and the bi-partisan consensus reached on the National Affairs Conference in 1990, the
Second  Constitutional  Amendment  in  1992  was  made  possible.   There  were  eight
amended articles passed by the National Assembly on May 27, 1992, and promulgated
by the President on May 28.  One of the key points of these amended articles was that
local self-governance ought to be granted a legal basis and the provincial governor and
municipal mayors should be elected by popular vote. 5  On July 1994, the
Self-Governance Act for Provinces and Counties and the Self-Governance Act for
Special Municipalities were signed by the President, and elections for the Governor of
Taiwan Provincial government and Mayors for the Taipei and Kaohsiung cities were held
respectively for the first time in the same year.
Although the local self-governance was in a process of legalization during this period of
time and substantial improvements had been made, intergovernmental problems and
conflicts between Central and local governments in Taiwan had been intensified and
incandesced after the Governor and the Mayors were directly elected.  For example,
Taipei City Council had asked for more authorities for local self-governance relentlessly,
some of the requests and petitions had resulted in Constitution Interpretation No. 234
(regarding General Revenue Sharing, 1989/3/3), 235 (regarding the authority of National
Auditing Office to audit the finances of the Provincial and Municipality governments,
1989/3/17), 279 (regarding premium subsidy provided by the Provincial or Municipality
government to different categories of workers insured with labor insurance according to
Labor Insurance Act, 1991/5/17), and 307 (relating to whether the Provincial or County
governments can set expenditure budgets for matters of police administration,
1992/10/30).  In these Interpretations, although the Council of Grand Justices had
upheld the Central government’s positions that the related laws were not unconstitutional,
they nevertheless had created tremendous pressures for more and faster reforms in local
government system.
4 Information source: http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/EN/p03_01.asp?expno=260.
5 Information source: http://english.www.gov.tw/Yearbook/index.jsp?categid=22&recordid=52746.
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III. The Downsizing of Provincial government Phase (1994-1999)
The quests for the legalization of local self-governance had resulted in the passage of the
Self-Governance Act for Provincial Government and Self-Governance Act for Special
Municipality in  July,  1994.   On  the  basis  of  the  former,  the  Governor  was  able  to  be
elected directly by the citizens of Taiwan Province for the first time in 1994.  Although
these two Acts had partially achieved the goals of legalizing the local self-governance,
their contents had been criticized as failed to taking into considerations of structural
problems associated with the “guardign self-governance”.  The crucial problem was the
ambigus allocation of power between the Central and Provicial governments,
particularly the four-level government structure in which the status of Provincial
government and Spacial Municipalities had not been changed (Hwang, 1995:19-33).
After the Governor was inauguated in 1995, many events had occurred in which the
Provincial government challenged the authorities of the Central government from time to
time, the conflicting central-local relations had been intensified (Chao, 1998).
In March 1996, the first presidential election in the history of political development in
Taiwan was over.  A National Development Conference was held later that year in
which  another  constitutional  reform  consensus  was  reached  among  the  participated
political elites.  On issues related to local governance reform, they agreed to downsize
the functions and organizations of the Provincial government, and to freeze the
gubernatorial election in the next term.  In July 1997, decisions such as the terms for the
Governor and members of Provincial Assembly should be ended on December 20, 1998,
and the respective elections should be terminated accordingly was made during the forth
round of Constitutional amendment.  Consequentially, the Legislative Yuan passed the
Regulations Governing the Adjustments of Taiwan Provincial Government's Functions,
Business and Organization in October 1998 to set objectives and schedule to downsize
the Provincial government.  Basically, the Provincial government would remain as a
legal entity, but its status as a local self-governance organization was no longer valid.
As originally scheduled, the Self-Governance Act for Provincial Government was
formerly replaced by the Local Government System Act in January 1999.  To certain
extend, the once powerful Taiwan Provincial government was history thereafter.6
The downsizing the Provincial government could be attributed to the dysfunction of the
6 The Taiwan Provincial Government has not been abolished.  The Governor was appointed by the
Executive Yuan, and it was gradually reduced to a minimum of two hundred employees with very limited
functions over the past seven some years.  Since 2006, the Executive Yuan appointed no one to the post.
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four-level government structure.  According to Wei (2000: 82-84), the former Minister
of RDEC (1999.07-2000.05), the four-level government structure had not only created
red-type, but also reduced administrative efficiency and quality.  The expected results of
downsizing the Provincial government included: to reduce the number of overlapping
agencies, civil servants, laws and regulations; to improve fiscal conditions; to enhance
local autonomy and administrative quality; and to reengineer administrative process
(Wei, 2000: 89-99).
Another  reason  for  this  Provincial  level  reform  was  the  potential  power  conflicts
between the President and the Governor.  According to the Constitutional Amendment
passed on May 28, 1992, the President of the Republic of China (Taiwan) would be
elected by popular sovereignty for the first time in 1996.  However, between 1994 and
1996, former President Teng-hui Lee was not elected directly.  Compared to former
Governor James Song who had been elected by several million of voters in Taiwan,
although both of them were from the same party, President Lee was facing a legitimacy
crisis.   Even  if  the  President  was  also  directly  elected,  since  the  populations  and
territories of the Taiwan Province and the Central government overlapped for more than
eighty percent, the potential political tensions and conflicts between the Governor and
the President were almost inevitable.  It had been speculated that these so called
“Yeltsin’s Effects” might have induced the reform of downsizing the Provincial
government.7
IV. The Local Government Systems Act Phase (1999-present)
The previous phase might be described as the most turbulent one in the evolution of local
governance in Taiwan, but the passage of Local Government System Act does not imply
that local governance reform has been completed.  Downsizing the Provincial
government might have solve one structural problem for local governance, there are
other  reform  issues  needed  to  be  dealt  with,  such  as  how  to  accomplish  one  of  the
ultimate goals of local governance reform in Taiwan – to become a two-levels (Central
and County) government structure?  Should County government be allowed to be
upgraded into a special municipality?  How to redraw the administrative boundaries of
local governments?  Should the executive leaders at township level be appointed by
county magistrate rather than elected?  How to mutually adjust the functions of village
level government and the community development systems (Hwang, 2000; Liu, 2003)?
7 Taking into consideration of the scenario regarding the former Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev and
Boris Yeltsin, this type of potential conflicts were referred as the “Yeltsin Effects” in Taiwan.
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On the other hand, although the Act Governing the Allocation of Government Revenues
and Expenditures has been modified in accordance with the Local Government Systems
Act, the newly emerged “party turnover” effects8 have intensified the competitions for
intergovernmental resources.  Thus, the rationalizations of mechanisms for monitoring
and supervising local self-governance and for allocating intergovernmental revenues are
the two very important issues in this phase.  No. 498 and No. 550 Interpretations are
directly related to the issue of intergovernmental revenue, and the results have given the
local governments more equal position in dealing with the Central government than
before.  Both of them can be understood as passive protections for local governments,
but they ought to be defined together as a basis upon which central-local partnership can
be developed initially.
As for the matters of supervising local-governance, the Grand Justices have made their
positions clear in No. 527 (June 15, 2001) and No. 553 (December 20, 2002)
Interpretations.  They explain various aspects of the Local Government Systems Act in
terms of its norms and underlying principles regarding local self-governance.  The
Grand Justices explicitly identify the rights for the local self-governing body to file
petition for constitutional interpretation to against any perceived unlawful supervision
from the central government in these two cases, and they try to direct the attentions of the
parties involved to resolve their conflicts through due process of administrative litigation.
These two Interpretations ought to be able to reduce unnecessary vertical
intergovernmental conflict and potential petition for constitutional interpretation.
In general, these four phases provide a brief historical background upon which local
government reforms in Taiwan can be assessed.  As in any other unitary state, the power
to  design  government  architecture  is  always  concentrated  in  Taiwan’s  Central
government.  Despite the efforts of the local governments, local governance reforms
have been packaged by the Central government as a part of its grand “government
reinvention” program.  That is to say, local government reforms are structured and
implemented according to the same reform framework and strategies that are designed
for the transformation of Central government in Taiwan
8 Although party competitions were very high at the local level, KMT had swept elections at the national
level though out the years.  But the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) had won the Presidential election
for the first time in 2000, and President Cheng was reelected in 2004.  There are many evidences
indicating that the transition has not been smooth.  In the foreseeable future, party turnover effects tend to
disturb government operations at every level in Taiwan.
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A SMALLER AND CAPABLE LOCAL GOVERNMENT?
On the basis of the conclusions reached on the National Development Conference in
1996, the notion of “entrepreneurial government” has been widely accepted among
public administration scholars and practitioners in Taiwan as the dominant model of the
“Government Reinvention” programs.  To support the Conference’s conclusions and to
response to a suggestion made by the Economic Development Advisory Committee at a
meeting  convened  in  2001,  the  Office  of  the  President  set  up  a  Committee  of
Government Reform charged with the task of promoting and restructuring “an energetic
government that is globally competitive.”  The spirits of the proposed reform include
“customer-oriented, elastic and innovative partnership, accountable politics, and honest
and capable government;” and its visions are “to establish an innovative and
service-oriented mechanism; to streamline the administrative organizations; to
create a professional and efficient personnel system; to develop an autonomous and
coordinated governmental structure; and to arrive at a reformed Legislative Yuan
that abides by people’s opinion.” (RDEC, 2003:14)  Figure 1 presents the
comprehensive framework for designing the current government restructuring programs
in Taiwan.
Figure1:
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Although it can be argued that the design of “Government Reinvention” program in
Taiwan actually embraces many types of reform ideas, such as market mechanism for
better service delivery and managerialism for more flexible tools for the managers,
“entrepreneurial government” is officially used by RDEC (2003:12) as the dominant
theme of reform.
As suggested by Kellough (1998:8), “reinvention is, quite frankly, a set of proposed
reforms aimed at solving persistent problems in government by promising that we can do
more with less.”  The notion of “a smaller and capable government” has also prevailed
in the organization reform (Central as well as local governments) framework in Taiwan
(Wei, 2000:55-58).  In addition to downsizing the Provincial government, the efforts to
restructure government functions and organizations by incorporating market mechanism
and voluntary organizations (i.e., deregulation, corporatization, and outsourcing) into
public service delivery system are to make central and local governments in Taiwan
smaller.  On the other hand, the devolution of functions and authorities to the local
governments is made by emphasizing the importance of enhancing local capacities in
decision-making and implementation.
Despite all these efforts, question can be raised regarding the results of government
reform in Taiwan in general, and its impacts on the local government in particular.  On
the one hand, there are conflicting evidences indicating that the experiences of
government reinvention in the United States are controversial at best (Durst and Newell,
1999; Brudney et al., 1999; Gargan, 1997; Kellough, 1998).  On the other hand, an
empirical assessment of the Central government reform programs in Taiwan suggests
that its implementation has not achieved the desired objectives due to lack of political
supports from the President (Sun, 2006).  Thus, have the reinvention efforts been
successful at the local level in Taiwan?  Or, to be more specifically, have local
governments in Taiwan become smaller and better?  This question will be analyzed by
looking at three related aspects: Has the size of local government in terms of employee
and financial figures been smaller?  Has the level of corruption been lower?  And, how
does local citizens evaluate the performance of their own local government?
The Size of Local Government
Local governments in Taiwan consist of two Provincial governments (Taiwan and
Fujian), two Special Municipalities (Taipei and Kaohsiung), sixteen County
governments, and five City governments.  Due to the effects of downsizing the
Provincial government, and the special status of the Special Municipality, they are
excluded from the following analysis.
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2000 114370 88671 (77.53) 25699 (22.47)
2001 122371 96673 (79.00) 25698 (21.00)
2002 125983 100875 (80.07) 25108 (19.93)
2003 104290 157655 53365 109034 (69.16) 48621 (30.84)
2004 106082 161029 54947 122930 (76.34) 38099 (23.66)
2005 106565 158949 52384 122423 (77.02) 36526 (22.98)
Sources: Combined from Personnel Yearly Report, various years, Central Personnel
Administration. http://www.tpgpd.gov.tw/statistic/index.htm
Table 1 presents the personnel statistics of County and City governments9 in Taiwan
between 2000 and 2005.  Due to changes in the reporting format, no data regarding the
official (budget-allocated) positions before 2003 is available, but it is clear that the
number has increased from 104,290 positions in 2003 to 106,565 in 2005.  Not only the
budget-allocated positions have been increased, the actual number of employee has also
increased from 114,370 in 2000 to 158,949 in 2005.  The difference between the
budget-allocated positions and the actual number of employee over the three-year period
(2003-2005) is more than fifty thousand people in each year.  The difference is partially
attributed by the contracted temporary employees, ranged from 36,526 in 2005 to 48,621
in 2003, but the reason for the remaining “extra” employees is not clear.  Some of those
temporary employees are on contract basis due to special projects (mandates) initiated by
the Central government, they are paid by contract grants provided by the Central
government. However, many of these temporary employees are hired on the basis of
favoritism rather than merit principle, and they tend to stay in office even after the
Central government projects are over.
Given that outsourcing is encouraged by the Central government as a strategy of
government reform, these temporary employees do not constitute what Light (1999) has
termed the “shadow government.”  Although there is a tendency to decrease over the
past several years, they still occupy more than 20 percent of Taiwan local government’s
work force.
Another  way  of  evaluating  the  size  of  local  government  in  Taiwan  is  to  examine  the
9  Data include civil servants employed by the County/City and township governments.  However,
principles and teachers working at high, junior high and elementary schools are excluded.
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amount of expenditures spent on civil servants’ salary and related benefits (see Table 2).
On average, personnel-related expenditures constitute about 55 percent of local
government’s total expenditures.  Moreover, personnel related expenditures in local
government is 106.75 percent of its own revenue (local taxes plus General Revenue
Sharing), and it is 145.34 percent of its self revenue (local taxes only) in 2004.
Although the descending trend is encouraging, the sheer size of local government
employees is large enough that its expenditures can not be covered by pooling local taxes
and General Revenue Sharing together.

























2001 254,971,979 483,947,222 52.69 212,697,364 151,209,136 119.88 168.62
2002 266,022,763 456,469,296 58.28 226,146,357 156,605,793 117.63 169.87
2003 272,142,635 478,622,846 56.86 237,746,129 172,423,658 114.47 157.83
2004 281,022,351 511,245,365 54.97 263,242,373 193,349,866 106.75 145.34
Note: 1. Personnel Expenditures do not include that of township governments.
2. Own revenue include General Revenue Sharing, Self revenue do not.
Sources: Combined from Statistics Yearly Reports, Ministry of Audit.
http://www.audit.gov.tw/Doc/DocList.aspx?MenuId=Fin
From the financial aspect, the total local government expenditure is about 511.25 billion
NT dollars in 2004.  Using the figure in 2000 as the base line, local government
expenditure has been increased by 5.64 percent.  Together, grants, mandate revenue and
General Revenue Sharing that were provided by the Central government occupied more
than forty percent (41.61%) of total local government expenditures in 2004, and it has
increased about 10 percent since 2001.
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2001 483,947,222 100 192,709,045 39.82 100 194,633,688 40.22 100
2002 456,469,296 94.32 170,015,326 37.25 88.22 238,647,688 52.28 122.61
2003 478,622,846 98.90 204,212,010 42.67 105.97 281,518,123 58.82 144.64
2004 511,245,365 105.64 212,752,881 41.61 110.40 303,354,346 59.34 155.86
Note: 2001 is the base year to calculate the increase ratios.
Sources: Combined from Statistics Yearly Reports, Ministry of Audit.
http://www.audit.gov.tw/Doc/DocList.aspx?MenuId=Fin
To make the financial situation of Taiwan’s local government even worse, public debts
are about 59.34 percent of total expenditures in 2004, which is much higher than what is
allowed according to the Public Debt Act (the maximum limit is set at 45%)10, and the
percentage has increased by 55.86 percent over four year period (from 2001 to 2004, see
Table  3).   Local  governments  in  Taiwan  can  barely  survive  if  they  can  not  borrow
money from the private sector.
In sum, there is no illusion of smallness in terms of the size of local government in
Taiwan.  Since former Premier Vincent Shiew proposed the “Government Reinvention”
programs in 1998, government reform efforts have not substantially reduced the number
of local government employees and expenditures after all these years.
Corruption
But, has local governments in Taiwan become better?  There is no data available
regarding the capacity of local government in Taiwan, the level of corruption is adopt as
the variable to examine the issue from a slightly different perspective instead.
Anti-corruption is one major objective for government reform in Taiwan.  The current
10 See Public Debt Act,
http://www.tccg.gov.tw/site/3fd694a1/3fd6bc0f/44f90782/4541a172/files/law-7.doc
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administration has started an “Anti-corruption Action Plan” on July 1,  2000, a total  of
3,467 cases and 8,720 people have been prosecuted for corruption over the past six year
period (from July, 2000 to December, 2006), and the total money involved is 2.8 billion
NT dollars (see Table 4).















6 years Before 3,781 8,924 421 609 1,745 3,384 2,765 32,738,410,431
6 years After 3,467 8,720 467 542 1,575 2,676 3,460 28,450,833,238
Increase/decrease
%
-8.30 -2.29 10.93 -11.00 -9.74 -20.92 25.14 -13.10
Notes: C.S. = Civil Servants; R. = Representatives; G.P. = General Public.
Sources: Ministry of Justice, based on figures provided by District Courts and District
Prosecutors Offices. http://www.moj.gov.tw/public/Attachment/61059511175.pdf
Compare the figures to that of the six-year period before the plan was started (3,781
cases, 8,924 people and 3.2 billion NT dollars, 1994- 2000), data indicate that the level of
corruption at the local level has been controlled to certain degree (decreased about 8.3%,
2.29% and 13.1% respectively).  However, among those people who have been charged
for corruption, more high level civil servants and general public are involved (increased
by 10.93% and 25.14% respectively after the 2000), but there is a substantial
improvement for the low level government employee (decreased by 20.92%).
Seemingly, while the integrity of local civil servants has been improved, it is the middle
and low level public employees who can better control their greedy.  If more high level
civil servants in local governments are involved in corruption, it is assumed that these
cases tend to be larger scandals.
According to a survey recently conducted by the Common Wealth magazine during the
period from August 30 to September 12, 2006, when the respondents were asked about
do  they  think  their  local  chief  executive  (magistrate  or  mayor)  are  honest,  only  4
magistrates (Taoyuan, Kaohsiung, Hualien, Penghu County) and 3 mayors (Hsinchu,
Taichung, Chiayi City) have been approved (honest or very honest) by more than 50% of
the  respondents  (see  Table  5,  Column  C).   When  they  were  asked  to  evaluate  the
integrity of their local civil servants or representatives, only the Penghu County has more
than forty percent of the respondents (45.5%) in that county said that their civil servants
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and representatives are not seriously corrupted (Table 5, Column D), and only six other
local governments (Yilan, Taoyuan, Taitung County and Hualien, Hsinchu, Chiayi City)
have more than thirty percent of the respondents in these Counties or Cities said so.
Although corruption at the local level in Taiwan might have been seemingly improved in
terms of objective indicators (the number of case and people involved, see Table 4), local
citizens do not have high confidence in the integrity of their civil servants and
representatives subjectively.
Performance Assessments
Performance assessment is another aspect to evaluate the capacity of local governments
in Taiwan.  There are two types of question can be used to assess the performance of
individual local government, one is concerning local identity (i.e., the sense of “proud”)
and improvement in government services, another is about the performance of local chief
executive (Magistrate or Mayor).
The magazine of Global Views Monthly had conducted a survey regarding the
performance of Taiwan’s local governments in 2005.  One question asked the
respondents to indicate whether they are proud of their own local government, another
question asked the respondents to reflect their opinions as whether their own County or
City government had made substantial improvement.11 There are only twelve local
governments in which over seventy percent of the respective respondents indicate that
they are proud of their home county or city (Table 5, Column A).  The benchmark (over
70%) is presumably not a very high standard.   And using sixty percent as the
benchmark, there are only twelve local governments which are believed by the
respondents as making good progress (Table 5, Column B).  Again, the record of
evaluation has not been very impressive.
In another survey which was conducted by the United Daily News on November 11,
2006, respondents were asked to answer the following question: “Are you satisfied about
the overall performance of your magistrate/mayor?”  There are only nine local chief
executives, out of the total of twenty-one local governments included in this study, been
evaluated by more than fifty percent of the respondents in these Counties or Cities
respectively  as  satisfied  or  very  satisfied  (See  Table  5,  Column  E).   Taoyuan  County
magistrate has the highest approval rating (71.5%), and the Mayor of Keelung City has
the lowest one (27.8%).
11 2005 is the last year of the four-year term for the previous Magistrate or Mayor (2001- 2005).
Therefore, the survey question was designed as “After three and half years, do you think your county/city
have made substantial progress?” (see Table 5, Column B).
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If the evaluation is made on a 100 points scale, only seven magistrates or mayors passed
the 60 points benchmark of the performance assessment (Table 5, Column F).  There are
one magistrate (Hualien County) and one mayor (Tainan City) who have good approval
ratings (66.8% and 65.6% respectively) but have failed the performance assessment (57
and 53 points respectively).














































(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F)
County
Taipei 65.1 69.1 35.9 15.9 38.9 36
Yilan 76.8 58.5 46.0 34.8 48.3 45
Taoyuan 74.4 63.7 60.2 32.7 71.5 68
Hsinchu 80.9 64.3 41.0 29.4 70.6 64
Miaoli 65.6 60.9 38.5 24.4 44.9 48
Taichung 75.0 66.4 42.5 22.3 60.5 60
Changhua 69.2 51.2 41.6 23.9 46.0 51
Nantou 67.1 41.6 40.5 23.9 43.2 47
Yunlin 52.0 38.8 37.1 18.0 39.5 48
Chiayi 70.3 65.0 35.6 22.9 64.4 62
Tainan 70.9 50.2 33.1 16.1 46.4 42
Kaohsiung 66.2 65.7 61.1 24.4 69.2 62
Pingtung 68.5 52.7 44.5 24.0 41.8 43
Taitung 74.0 63.0 31.4 30.9 38.2 38
Hualien 79.2 65.9 54.8 33.0 66.8 57
Penghu 80.9 77.2 51.7 45.5 52.7 52
City
Keelung 52.6 41.4 13.0 19.0 27.8 27
Hsinchu 76.9 68.0 53.8 36.4 70.9 70
Taichung 75.4 57.4 63.2 23.9 60.0 67
Chiayi 64.3 49.4 50.4 30.1 49.9 51
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Tainan 77.1 62.3 38.3 23.4 65.6 53
Notes: Column A and B are based on a survey conducted by the United Daily News
on November 11, 2006; Column C and D are based on a survey conducted by the
Common Wealth magazine, no. 354 (August 30 – September 12, 2006); Column E
and F are based on a survey conducted by the Global Views Monthly, no. 229 (July,
2005).
DISCUSSIONS
Has local government in Taiwan become smaller and better as the results of Government
Reinvention programs?  The answer to this question has to be a qualified “no”.  The
strategies and visions of Taiwan’s government reform are designed according to the
model of entrepreneurial government which emphasizes the notion of “smaller and
better” in government structure and function.  The same design and strategies have also
been applied to reform the local government.  However, data has indicated that the size
of local government in Taiwan has not been smaller in terms of personnel and financial
indicators; the level of corruption has been improved but more high level local civil
servants have involved in corruption cases; and citizen’s assessments of the performance
of local governments and their chief executives have been relatively unsatisfactory.
There can be several potential reasons for explaining the results: (1) the fierce
competition  between  political  parties  might  have  consumed  too  many  energies  and
resources which ought to be concentrated on implementing the reform programs. (2)
there  might  be  a  gap  between  the  comprehensiveness  in  the  design  of  reform  and  the
feasibility of implementing the reform; (3) the newly emerged party turnover effects
might have discouraged public administrators to faithfully carry out the reform programs;
(4) political correct might have replaced professionalism as the basis for government
operation; (5) civil servants in the local governments might not have sufficient
capabilities to fulfill the reform objectives; (6) local governments might not have
adequate human and financial resources to carry out the reform programs; (7) the efforts
of Central and local governments might not been well coordinated; and (8) the concept of
entrepreneurial government and the notion of “smaller and better” government might not
fit the political, social and economic conditions in Taiwan, either culturally or
contextually.  These hypothetical explanations require careful examinations in the
future.
In addition, three observations can be made regarding the evolution of local governance
in Taiwan.  First, Taiwan is still muddling through in the process of authoritarian
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transition.  Although the records of democratic development are outstanding,
government structure and the allocation of power remain unstable in Taiwan.  Second,
the direction of further decentralization is clear in the evolution of local governance in
Taiwan.  In the pursuit of decentralization, institutionalization and legalization are two
pillars for the success of future reforms.
Third,  local  government  and  the  Justices  of  Constitutional  Court  have  played  very
important  roles  in  local  governance  reform in  Taiwan.   There  have  been  a  total  of  30
intergovernmental-relations related Constitution Interpretations, their distributions are 11,
10, 4 and 5 in the respective phases as mentioned above.  The descending numbers may
suggest the stabilization of central-local conflicts in Taiwan, but it also indicates that the
Justices of Constitutional Court has contributed significantly in solving local governance
related Constitutional crisis.  On the other hand, among these 30 cases, 18 are filed by
individual local governments, only 6 are initiated by the Central government (Chiang,
2006:65).  It is the local government whose relentless struggles against the Central
government that have stimulated the process of local governance reform in Taiwan.
CONCLUSION
Doherty and Stone (1999:157) have described the practice in U.S. local government
as experiencing the difficulties of “increasingly fragmented, fiscal strained, and subject
to broad public disenchantment.”  These difficulties tend to be amplified in the contexts
of authoritarian transition in Taiwan.  The urging demands for better government
structure and more democratic governance in the globalization era have pushed Taiwan
into a new phase of local governance transformation.  If a smaller and capable local
government is truly desirable in Taiwan, more attentions ought to be focused on the
implementation of government reform programs.  Otherwise, a new and more holistic
perspective is needed for building an energetic government that is globally competitive
in Taiwan.
Milan Tung-Wen Sun is Professor at the Department of Public Policy and Administration
of National Chi Nan University.
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